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For Immediate Release
Press Release February 11th 2026

Green Party Senior Advisor Paul Kenny's Support for State-Led LNG terminal Analysed by ChatGPT
- Paul Kenny's submission is found to be "legally under-developed and dependent on assumptions about regulatory control that may not hold" in treating an FSRU "as a controllable policy instrument" instead of "as a structural market intervention that cannot be neatly constrained once built"



Paul Kenny and Eamon Ryan. Source: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/paulgkenny_an-incredible-four-years-working-as-advisor-activity-7217454220113756161-jyXC

Paul Kenny was Green Party Leader, Eamon Ryan's special advisor for 4 years and strong supporter of the State-led LNG terminal proposed by Minister Ryan, who was then Minister for Energy in Ireland. His answers at the Oireachtas Committtee hearing  on the proposed Strategic Gas Emergency Reserve Bill 2025 appeared almost Machiavellian to us and contradictory. We decided to put them through ChatGPT to confirm that we were not mistaken in how he seemed to structurally undermine environmental goals of energy policy in Ireland in a really devious way, almost like the enemy from within, while, we felt, trying to give the impression that he was for the environment. A master in gaslighting was our  conclusion, and we thought that it was no wonder so many naive environmental organisations and Green Party supporters were taken in by the tactic of changing the label of a US fracked gas LNG import terminal to a nonsense  label of temporary, strategic, non-commercial, non-entry-point,  third-party-access-prevented,  emergency-use-only gas reserve even though it would supply 13% of the gas market. In other words, a commercial LNG terminal masquerading as a Gas Storage facility. In this vein, we were disappointed, but not surprised  with his misleading statements such as "From a climate impact perspective, if this terminal is built and, true to what the Department actually says, it stays as a strategic reserve; if gas is not used to accelerate the regasification; and if we literally stay on boil-off gas, it will not make a very large difference to the global climate" and "we could use the legislation to state that any use of gas in an emergency situation would be outside the sectoral emissions ceilings and the national carbon budget"!!
We asked ChatGpt two questions on the submissions by Paul Kenny to the Oireachtas Committee on Climate Change pre-legislative scrutiny hearings.:


The answers and conclusions are amazing and show the clear contradictions in his position - and ultimately the position of his political master at the time - the Green Party Leader Eamon Ryan.

Answer to first question:
Here is a structured outline of tensions and contradictions in Paul Kenny’s statements to the Oireachtas committee. These are not necessarily logical impossibilities, but areas where his position shifts, qualifies itself, or pulls in different directions.

1️⃣ “We should not focus on gas” vs “This FSRU is the right solution to the hybrid attack risk”
Statement A:
He repeatedly argues that Ireland’s real energy security solution is:
Statement B:
When pressed specifically on the single hybrid attack risk (interconnector sabotage), he states:
“In short, no” — there is no better alternative than the FSRU in the timeframe available.
Tension:
He criticises the FSRU as addressing only a narrow risk and not broader security threats, yet concedes that for the specific risk identified in the Energy Security Review, it is the correct mitigation.
This creates a dual position:

2️⃣ “This will not improve broader energy security” vs “It is exactly the right solution”
He says:
Yet he also says:
“If we were concerned about a boat dropping an anchor… this is exactly the right solution.”
Contradiction tension:
He downplays the security value of the FSRU at a macro level but simultaneously affirms it as the correct response to the most clearly identified near-term physical threat.
The inconsistency lies in framing:

3️⃣ “We could meet demand through acceleration” vs “No, we cannot build renewables as fast”
When discussing whether renewables and interconnectors could substitute for the FSRU:
He says:
“Honestly, the answer is yes.” (We could meet N-1 standard if accelerated.)
Later, when asked whether renewables can be built in the same timeframe as the FSRU:
“The answer is ‘No’ because it is one project versus 50 projects.”
Contradiction tension:
So the feasibility shifts depending on whether he is speaking:

4️⃣ “This could cost €1 billion for only 3–5 years of risk mitigation” vs “We need it because renewables will be delayed”
He argues:
But earlier he acknowledges:
Tension:
If renewables are structurally delayed and the State cannot accelerate delivery, the FSRU may not be short-lived. His own diagnosis of systemic delay undercuts his suggestion that the facility would only be needed briefly.

5️⃣ “Commercial LNG would damage renewables” vs “If limited to reserve use, climate impact is small”
He makes two distinct arguments:
A. Climate/system risk argument
B. Climate accounting argument
Tension:
He shifts from strong structural opposition (commercial LNG undermines renewables) to a more neutral climate accounting position (limited reserve use makes little difference).
The contradiction lies in:

6️⃣ “The State is under-resourced” vs “The Department can do this”
He argues:
But when asked if the Department can handle the bespoke planning process for the FSRU:
“The Department would be well capable of doing that.”
Then he qualifies:
“But those resources will then not be working on the things we need…”
Tension:
He criticises systemic under-resourcing but affirms capacity for this emergency project — implying:

7️⃣ “FSRU does not reduce systemic LNG risk” vs “It displaces UK LNG”
He says:
But also:
It would displace LNG currently regasified in the UK and sent to Ireland.
This suggests:
The tension is subtle but present.

8️⃣ “We should stop digging” vs “This is physics, Corrib decline is inevitable”
He argues strongly for:
Yet when Corrib decline is discussed, he dismisses it as irrelevant to energy security.
This underplays the domestic supply decline that partly drives the emergency reserve argument.

Overall Pattern
Paul Kenny’s position is not outright contradictory, but layered and conditional:
Strategic Position
Operational Concession
Long-term answer = renewables + demand reduction
Short-term hybrid attack risk = FSRU
Systemic LNG risk not solved
Single interconnector sabotage risk solved
Acceleration could work
Realistically too slow
Climate impact limited (if restricted)
Commercial LNG would be damaging
He holds:
The tension comes from oscillating between those frames without always clearly distinguishing them.

Core Contradiction Summary
The central contradiction is this:
He argues the FSRU is strategically misaligned with Ireland’s long-term energy security and decarbonisation goals — yet simultaneously concedes it is the correct and perhaps only realistic short-term mitigation for the specific hybrid interconnector risk identified by the State.
That dual stance makes his evidence nuanced — but also internally strained.
Answer to 2nd question: 
If you layer Safety Before LNG’s arguments on top of Paul Kenny’s evidence, the weaknesses in his position become more structural and legal rather than just strategic.
Kenny’s argument is primarily:
Safety Before LNG’s submissions attack the assumption that such tight limitation is legally and politically possible.
When you combine both, here are the main weaknesses that emerge in Kenny’s position:

1️⃣ His argument depends on a legal assumption that may not hold
Kenny repeatedly says:
If robustly limited to emergency use only…
If it is not a commercial terminal…
If gas use is capped…
If commercial LNG is prevented…
Safety Before LNG argues that under EU gas market law:
If that legal interpretation is correct, then Kenny’s central condition collapses:
The FSRU cannot be “emergency-use only” in the way he assumes.
Weakness in his position:
He does not address EU third-party access law at all.
His entire support for the FSRU rests on it remaining non-commercial. If that is legally impossible, his conditional support becomes internally unstable.

2️⃣ He treats commercialisation as a policy risk — not a structural inevitability
Kenny says commercial LNG would:
But he treats this as something the committee can “scrutinise away.”
Safety Before LNG argues:
Weakness:
Kenny assumes commercialisation is avoidable through good drafting.
Safety Before LNG suggests it may be legally unavoidable once infrastructure exists.
If true, then Kenny is underestimating path dependency and regulatory lock-in.

3️⃣ He underestimates the “entry point” problem
Kenny says:
Safety Before LNG argues:
Weakness:
Kenny treats physical gas flows as neutral if limited.
Safety Before LNG treats infrastructure as structurally transformative.
He focuses on emissions and contingency logic.
They focus on market law and precedent effects.
If the infrastructure legally becomes a market entry point, his “limited impact” framing becomes weaker.

4️⃣ He does not address governance concentration risks
Kenny’s focus:
Safety Before LNG’s focus:
Kenny does not meaningfully engage with the governance architecture of the Bill.
Weakness:
His support for the FSRU as a narrow emergency measure ignores whether the governance mechanism is proportionate or constitutionally robust.
He treats it as a technical energy question.
The submission frames it as a democratic power-concentration issue.

5️⃣ He does not reconcile Climate Act compliance with “deemed compliance”
Kenny argues:
Safety Before LNG argues:
Weakness:
Kenny suggests legal drafting fixes (sunset clause, emission carve-outs).
But he does not address whether emergency LNG use could legally sit outside EU obligations or effort sharing targets.
His argument is practical.
The submission frames the issue as financial and EU law exposure.

6️⃣ His “short-term only” framing becomes unstable if emergency lasts years
Kenny says:
Safety Before LNG points out:
Weakness:
If technically the FSRU must import periodically to remain viable, then the line between “emergency reserve” and “operational entry point” blurs.
Kenny does not deeply engage with operational mechanics.

7️⃣ He concedes no better alternative — which strengthens the case against his broader critique
Kenny admits:
If Safety Before LNG’s legal argument blocks emergency-only operation, then:
Either:
This traps his position:
He supports it conditionally but does not offer a viable alternative within the timeframe.

8️⃣ He does not engage with litigation risk symmetry
Safety Before LNG raises:
Kenny argues:
Weakness:
He does not examine whether the State can both:
Under EU competition and internal market law, that may be harder than he assumes.

9️⃣ His argument relies heavily on political good faith
Kenny’s position works if:
Safety Before LNG’s submission assumes:
Kenny’s model assumes disciplined governance.
The submission assumes institutional opportunism.

The Core Vulnerability in Kenny’s Position
His argument is coherent only under these conditions:
Safety Before LNG challenges all five simultaneously.
If even one collapses (especially EU third-party access), then:

Final Synthesis
Without Safety Before LNG:
Kenny’s position is nuanced but defensible.
With Safety Before LNG’s legal and governance critique added:
His position appears:
The biggest weakness exposed is this:
Kenny treats the FSRU as a controllable policy instrument.
Safety Before LNG treats it as a structural market intervention that cannot be neatly constrained once built.
That is the fault line.


ENDS

Contact:
John McElligott - Tel.: 087-2804474 - Email: [email protected]
www.SafetyBeforeLNG.ie