 |
 |
 |
 |
|
|
HOME |
PRESS RELEASES |
LINKS |
ABOUT US |
CONTACT US |
For Immediate Release. Press Release February 11th 2026
(updated February 20th)
"Non-Commercial" State LNG Scam by Former Green Party Leader Eamon Ryan exposed by his special advisor Paul Kenny's appearance at Climate Committee hearing.
- In order to get a fracked gas import LNG terminal built in Ireland, in contravention of Green Party policy at the time, party leader Eamon Ryan and his advisor Paul Kenny promoted the concept of a State LNG terminal that would only be used if the interconnector was damaged, but in a sleight of hand they never addressed the fact that this is impossible because a State LNG terminal must allow private commercial use by third parties under EU law, while already supplying 13% of the irish gas market.
Paul Kenny and Eamon Ryan. Source: https://www.linkedin.com/posts/paulgkenny_an-incredible-four-years-working-as-advisor-activity-7217454220113756161-jyXC
Beware of what politicians and their advisors do, not what they say!
Green Party leader Eamon Ryan and his
special advisor Paul Kenny talked a good talk about
environmental sustainability but our anaysis is that they only paid lip service to the
campaign against the importation of fracked gas via LNG terminals in
Ireland. Their real goal, it seems, was to gaslight and manage the real
environmentalists and grass-root activists in Ireland while working underhandedly, we
felt, to deliver a massive Forever-LNG import terminal in the
Shannon Estuary. Try and figure that one out! They seem to us to have
been doing the opposite to what they said they were doing all the time!
They spoke for the enviroment, but we feel like they acted as agents
for the fossil fuel sector all along.
Who is Paul Kenny?
Paul Kenny was Green Party Leader, Eamon Ryan's special advisor for 4 years and
a strong supporter of the State-led LNG terminal proposed by Minister
Ryan, who was then Minister for Energy in Ireland. His answers at the
Oireachtas
Committtee hearing
on the proposed Strategic Gas Emergency
Reserve Bill 2025 appeared almost Machiavellian to us and
contradictory. His appearance at the hearings were like his swan song
of political advisor at the hightest level in Ireland, but to us, it
was to add salt to the wounds as he laid out his pro-LNG stance with no
shame and where his true colours were plain for all to see. He seemed
to have spent his 4 years in the corridors of
power in the Department of Energy structurally undermining
environmental goals of energy policy in Ireland in a really devious
way, almost like the enemy from within, while, we felt, trying to give
the
impression that he was for the environment. A master in gaslighting was
our conclusion, and we thought that it was no wonder so many
naive environmental organisations and Green Party supporters were taken
in by the
tactic of changing the label of a US fracked gas LNG import terminal to
a nonsense label of temporary, strategic, non-commercial,
non-entry-point, third-party-access-prevented,
emergency-use-only gas reserve even though it would supply 13% of the
gas
market. In other words, a commercial LNG terminal masquerading as a Gas
Storage facility. In this vein, we were disappointed, but not
surprised
with his misleading statements such as "From a climate impact
perspective, if this terminal is built and, true to what the Department
actually says, it stays as a strategic reserve; if gas is not used to
accelerate the regasification; and if we literally stay on boil-off
gas, it will not make a very large difference to the global climate" and "we
could use the legislation to state that any use of gas in an emergency
situation would be outside the sectoral emissions ceilings and the
national carbon budget"!!
EU law clearly indicates that the proposed State-owned LNG terminal is an Entry point [note 1] for gas into Ireland and makes it illegal to exempt commercial third-party access to LNG terminals built and operated by the Transmission Systems Operator (TSO) in Member States. As it so happens, Gas Networks Ireland, which the Department proposes will own and run an LNG terminal in Cahiracon, Kildysart, County Clare, is the actual gas network TSO for Ireland.
The entire basis for building a State-owned LNG terminal is that it would not be used commercially after the government recognised that the only way for fracked gas to come into the country in large quantities would be via LNG [note 2].
Paul Kenny not addressing EU exemptions to access rules
Operators of storage or LNG facilities are required under EU rules to grant energy companies non-discriminatory access to their infrastructure. They must offer the same service to different users under identical contractual conditions. If the State-led LNG terminal proposed by the Department supplies 13% of the country’s 2024 gas needs with up to six LNG tanker deliveries per year, then this would indicate that private commercial companies would be entitled to the same level of access. In certain circumstances however, major new infrastructure may be exempt from so-called third-party access rules. One of the criteria for gas infrastructure exemptions is that the infrastructure must be owned by a legally separate firm from the TSO in whose system it will operate, which in Ireland’s case is Gas Networks Ireland, the proposed owner of the State-led LNG terminal.
At the very least, Eamon Ryan and his advisor Paul Kenny, in the interest of
transparency and good governance, should have at least requested that the Department
obtain confirmation from the European Commission that it could exempt
third party access to a State-owned LNG terminal supplying up to 13% of
the country’s current gas consumption prior to proposing the never-heard-idea of a non-commercial LNG terminal.
Paul Kenny's submission was
found to be "legally under-developed
and dependent on assumptions about regulatory control that may not hold"
in treating an FSRU "as a
controllable policy instrument" instead of "as a structural market intervention that
cannot be neatly constrained once built", when we submitted his submission to further indepth analysis [note 3].
What else did Paul Kenny, Eamon Ryan and his Green Party colleagues do that was so wrong in our eyes?
This was just the icing on the cake.
In March 2021, in the High Court, Green Party Minister Ryan actually defended Ireland putting Shannon LNG on the EU Projects of Common Interest List, successfully arguing that the Irish Cabinet did not have to consider the Climate Impacts of such a decision - using a loophole in the Climate Act which he would later refuse to close in the new Climate Bill published earlier that year. The consequence of the PCI accreditation was that Shannon LNG would be considered in the overriding public interest as it went through the permit-granting process if it claimed PCI status.
On May 18th 2021 a new Irish Government policy against LNG terminals was published which stated that "pending the outcome of a review of the security of energy supply of Ireland’s electricity and natural gas systems being carried out by the Department of the Environment, Climate and Communications, it would not be appropriate for the development of any liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals in Ireland to be permitted or proceeded with".
However, Green Environment Minister Éamon Ryan and his advisors then repeatedly refused to agree to a direct order being given to An Bord Pleanála to comply with the new policy against LNG terminals, using the powers provided for under Section 29(1) of the Planning and Development Act 2000, as amended. For the order to be obligatory it had to be given before Shannon LNG lodged its planning application.
In June 2021, there was further bewilderment as the Green Party leader, Minister Eamon Ryan and the Green Party chairman of the Climate Committee, Deputy Brian Leddin blocked all amendments to the Climate Bill that would legally ban fracked gas imports.
In November 2024, having lost credibilty across the environmental movement for all their anti-environment and pro-LNG shenanigans, the Green Party went on to suffer a near wipe out in the November 2024 general election, losing 11 of their 12 Dáil seats.
ENDS
Contact:
John McElligott - Tel.: 087-2804474 - Email: [email protected]
Note:
1. Definition of Entry Point:
Article 2, points 57-64 of Directive (EU) 2024/1788 defines an "entry point" as a point subject to booking procedures by network users providing access to an entry-exit system, where "entry-exit system" is defined as an access model for natural gas or hydrogen where system users book capacity rights independently on entry and exit points, that includes the transmission system and may include the whole or part of the distribution system, or hydrogen networks. In this case Gas Networks Ireland is the system user booking capacity rights on the gas transmission network for up to 6 LNG tankers per year - or 13% of the current gas consumption in Ireland.
2. The Policy Statement on the Importation of Fracked Gas:
The Policy statement on the Importation of Fracked gas published in May 2021 confirmed that “the Government does not support the importation of fracked gas”. It recognised that “fracked gas can have significantly higher greenhouse gas emissions than conventional natural gas, both nationally and globally, and the widespread use of fracked gas would not be consistent with Ireland’s 2030 and 2050 climate objectives nor globally with the Paris Agreement;” It also declared that "Ireland imports much of its natural gas via the two interconnector pipelines from Moffat in Scotland, which provide the majority of natural gas currently used in Ireland. Given the level of fracked gas in the imports from Scotland is considered very low, the highest risk of fracked gas being imported into Ireland on a large-scale would be via liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, if any were to be constructed".
3. Analysing Paul Kenny's submissions with Chatgpt
We decided to ask ChatGpt two questions on the submissions by Paul Kenny to the Oireachtas Committee on Climate Change pre-legislative scrutiny hearings.:
Outline the contradictions in Paul Kenny's statements to the oireachtas committee on climate change here, and
What if we add the arguments from safety before LNG's submission 1 and submission 2. What would be the weaknesses in Paul Kenny's position then?
The answers and conclusions were amazing and showed the clear contradictions in his position - and ultimately the position of his political master at the time - the Green Party Leader Eamon Ryan. It found that Paul Kenny's submission to be "legally under-developed and dependent on assumptions about regulatory control that may not hold" in treating an FSRU "as a controllable policy instrument" instead of "as a structural market intervention that cannot be neatly constrained once built
Answer to first question:
Here is a structured outline of tensions and contradictions in Paul Kenny’s statements to the Oireachtas committee. These are not necessarily logical impossibilities, but areas where his position shifts, qualifies itself, or pulls in different directions.
1️⃣ “We should not focus on gas” vs “This FSRU is the right solution to the hybrid attack risk”
Statement A:
He repeatedly argues that Ireland’s real energy security solution is:
Reducing gas demand
Accelerating renewables
Building interconnectors
Expanding storage
He says broader geopolitical LNG risks are not solved by an FSRU and that systemic resilience must come from renewables.
Statement B:
When pressed specifically on the single hybrid attack risk (interconnector sabotage), he states:
“In short, no” — there is no better alternative than the FSRU in the timeframe available.
Tension:
He criticises the FSRU as addressing only a narrow risk and not broader security threats, yet concedes that for the specific risk identified in the Energy Security Review, it is the correct mitigation.
This creates a dual position:
Strategically sceptical of the project
Operationally supportive for a defined contingency
2️⃣ “This will not improve broader energy security” vs “It is exactly the right solution”
He says:
The FSRU does not address European LNG vulnerability
It does not protect against broader geopolitical conflict
It does not reduce systemic dependence
Yet he also says:
“If we were concerned about a boat dropping an anchor… this is exactly the right solution.”
Contradiction tension:
He downplays the security value of the FSRU at a macro level but simultaneously affirms it as the correct response to the most clearly identified near-term physical threat.
The inconsistency lies in framing:
At system level → limited value
At risk-specific level → appropriate solution
3️⃣ “We could meet demand through acceleration” vs “No, we cannot build renewables as fast”
When discussing whether renewables and interconnectors could substitute for the FSRU:
He says:
“Honestly, the answer is yes.” (We could meet N-1 standard if accelerated.)
Later, when asked whether renewables can be built in the same timeframe as the FSRU:
“The answer is ‘No’ because it is one project versus 50 projects.”
Contradiction tension:
He says in principle Ireland could meet the N-1 test through accelerated deployment.
But then concedes it cannot be done within the relevant timeframe.
So the feasibility shifts depending on whether he is speaking:
Technically (possible in theory)
Administratively (unlikely in practice)
4️⃣ “This could cost €1 billion for only 3–5 years of risk mitigation” vs “We need it because renewables will be delayed”
He argues:
Offshore wind and demand reduction will reduce gas need by early 2030s.
Therefore, the FSRU could be obsolete after only a few years.
It could be €1bn for a narrow and temporary risk.
But earlier he acknowledges:
Planning and delivery delays are real.
Renewables are already years late.
The State cannot mobilise fast enough.
Tension:
If renewables are structurally delayed and the State cannot accelerate delivery, the FSRU may not be short-lived. His own diagnosis of systemic delay undercuts his suggestion that the facility would only be needed briefly.
5️⃣ “Commercial LNG would damage renewables” vs “If limited to reserve use, climate impact is small”
He makes two distinct arguments:
A. Climate/system risk argument
Commercial LNG would undermine renewables
It would divert investment
It would increase gas dependence
B. Climate accounting argument
If used only as a reserve
If limited to boil-off gas
If it displaces UK-regasified LNG
→ “It will not make a very large difference to the global climate.”
Tension:
He shifts from strong structural opposition (commercial LNG undermines renewables) to a more neutral climate accounting position (limited reserve use makes little difference).
The contradiction lies in:
Structural/market distortion argument (strongly negative)
Marginal emissions argument (minimal difference)
6️⃣ “The State is under-resourced” vs “The Department can do this”
He argues:
CRU is 10 years late
Planning bodies are under-resourced
NPWS lacked mapping capacity
REPowerEU transposition took four years instead of six months
Resource allocation is the core problem
But when asked if the Department can handle the bespoke planning process for the FSRU:
“The Department would be well capable of doing that.”
Then he qualifies:
“But those resources will then not be working on the things we need…”
Tension:
He criticises systemic under-resourcing but affirms capacity for this emergency project — implying:
The system works when prioritised.
The issue is political prioritisation, not pure capacity.
7️⃣ “FSRU does not reduce systemic LNG risk” vs “It displaces UK LNG”
He says:
The FSRU does not reduce Europe’s LNG dependency.
It does not reduce systemic vulnerability.
But also:
It would displace LNG currently regasified in the UK and sent to Ireland.
This suggests:
It could change routing and possibly reduce one dependency channel.
But he still classifies it as not reducing systemic risk.
The tension is subtle but present.
8️⃣ “We should stop digging” vs “This is physics, Corrib decline is inevitable”
He argues strongly for:
Phasing out new gas connections
Reducing fossil infrastructure
Yet when Corrib decline is discussed, he dismisses it as irrelevant to energy security.
This underplays the domestic supply decline that partly drives the emergency reserve argument.
Overall Pattern
Paul Kenny’s position is not outright contradictory, but layered and conditional:
Strategic Position | Operational Concession |
|---|---|
Long-term answer = renewables + demand reduction | Short-term hybrid attack risk = FSRU |
Systemic LNG risk not solved | Single interconnector sabotage risk solved |
Acceleration could work | Realistically too slow |
Climate impact limited (if restricted) | Commercial LNG would be damaging |
He holds:
A long-term structural decarbonisation perspective
A short-term contingency realism
The tension comes from oscillating between those frames without always clearly distinguishing them.
Core Contradiction Summary
The central contradiction is this:
He argues the FSRU is strategically misaligned with Ireland’s long-term energy security and decarbonisation goals — yet simultaneously concedes it is the correct and perhaps only realistic short-term mitigation for the specific hybrid interconnector risk identified by the State.
That dual stance makes his evidence nuanced — but also internally strained.
Answer to 2nd question:
If you layer Safety Before LNG’s arguments on top of Paul Kenny’s evidence, the weaknesses in his position become more structural and legal rather than just strategic.
Kenny’s argument is primarily:
The FSRU is justified only as a narrow N-1 contingency.
It must be tightly limited.
It must not become commercial.
It must not expand gas demand.
It should have sunset clauses.
It should not undermine renewables.
Safety Before LNG’s submissions attack the assumption that such tight limitation is legally and politically possible.
When you combine both, here are the main weaknesses that emerge in Kenny’s position:
1️⃣ His argument depends on a legal assumption that may not hold
Kenny repeatedly says:
If robustly limited to emergency use only…
If it is not a commercial terminal…
If gas use is capped…
If commercial LNG is prevented…
Safety Before LNG argues that under EU gas market law:
LNG terminals are entry points.
TSOs (like Gas Networks Ireland) must grant non-discriminatory third-party access.
Exemptions require structural separation from the TSO.
A State-owned LNG terminal operated by GNI cannot legally deny access to commercial suppliers.
If that legal interpretation is correct, then Kenny’s central condition collapses:
The FSRU cannot be “emergency-use only” in the way he assumes.
Weakness in his position:
He does not address EU third-party access law at all.
His entire support for the FSRU rests on it remaining non-commercial. If that is legally impossible, his conditional support becomes internally unstable.
2️⃣ He treats commercialisation as a policy risk — not a structural inevitability
Kenny says commercial LNG would:
Divert investment from renewables.
Undermine decarbonisation.
Increase gas dependence.
Be damaging.
But he treats this as something the committee can “scrutinise away.”
Safety Before LNG argues:
Commercial access may not be optional.
The Bill allows private entities to apply.
Ministerial powers override planning.
There is no structural safeguard against market entry expansion.
Once built, the terminal creates de facto market capacity.
Weakness:
Kenny assumes commercialisation is avoidable through good drafting.
Safety Before LNG suggests it may be legally unavoidable once infrastructure exists.
If true, then Kenny is underestimating path dependency and regulatory lock-in.
3️⃣ He underestimates the “entry point” problem
Kenny says:
It would merely displace UK-regasified LNG.
Climate impact would be marginal if restricted.
It does not increase supply if controlled.
Safety Before LNG argues:
6 tankers per year = 13% of national demand.
That constitutes a new entry point.
Under EU law, that changes market structure.
It creates rights for private operators.
It may undermine refusal of Shannon LNG.
Weakness:
Kenny treats physical gas flows as neutral if limited.
Safety Before LNG treats infrastructure as structurally transformative.
He focuses on emissions and contingency logic.
They focus on market law and precedent effects.
If the infrastructure legally becomes a market entry point, his “limited impact” framing becomes weaker.
4️⃣ He does not address governance concentration risks
Kenny’s focus:
Resource constraints.
Planning delays.
Implementation capacity.
Safety Before LNG’s focus:
Minister self-approval.
Disapplication of planning law.
Deemed climate compliance.
Override of An Coimisiún Pleanála.
Reduced judicial review access.
Kenny does not meaningfully engage with the governance architecture of the Bill.
Weakness:
His support for the FSRU as a narrow emergency measure ignores whether the governance mechanism is proportionate or constitutionally robust.
He treats it as a technical energy question.
The submission frames it as a democratic power-concentration issue.
5️⃣ He does not reconcile Climate Act compliance with “deemed compliance”
Kenny argues:
The Climate Act should not be disapplied.
Emergency use could be placed outside sectoral ceilings.
There should be airtight limitations.
Safety Before LNG argues:
The Bill “deems” compliance.
That bypasses actual compatibility.
Operating 13% supply increases emissions materially.
€8–26bn EU exposure risk exists.
Weakness:
Kenny suggests legal drafting fixes (sunset clause, emission carve-outs).
But he does not address whether emergency LNG use could legally sit outside EU obligations or effort sharing targets.
His argument is practical.
The submission frames the issue as financial and EU law exposure.
6️⃣ His “short-term only” framing becomes unstable if emergency lasts years
Kenny says:
It might mitigate risk for 3–5 years.
After renewables scale up, it becomes redundant.
Safety Before LNG points out:
LNG tankers require constant replenishment.
Boil-off means continuous operation.
It cannot simply sit unused without import cycles.
Weakness:
If technically the FSRU must import periodically to remain viable, then the line between “emergency reserve” and “operational entry point” blurs.
Kenny does not deeply engage with operational mechanics.
7️⃣ He concedes no better alternative — which strengthens the case against his broader critique
Kenny admits:
No better short-term mitigation exists.
Renewables cannot be built in time.
Interconnectors take longer.
If Safety Before LNG’s legal argument blocks emergency-only operation, then:
Either:
The FSRU becomes commercial (which he opposes), or
It cannot legally function as proposed.
This traps his position:
He supports it conditionally but does not offer a viable alternative within the timeframe.
8️⃣ He does not engage with litigation risk symmetry
Safety Before LNG raises:
If the State operates LNG commercially,
How can it refuse private LNG terminals?
Could refusal trigger trade/investment litigation?
Kenny argues:
Commercial LNG would damage renewables.
It must be prevented.
Weakness:
He does not examine whether the State can both:
Operate LNG infrastructure
Refuse equivalent private infrastructure
Under EU competition and internal market law, that may be harder than he assumes.
9️⃣ His argument relies heavily on political good faith
Kenny’s position works if:
The Department strictly limits use.
Sunset clauses are enacted.
Third-party access is blocked.
Planning safeguards are restored.
Commercial LNG is legally prevented.
Safety Before LNG’s submission assumes:
Institutional drift.
Power expansion.
Legal ambiguity.
Market pressure.
Ministerial discretion.
Regulatory capture risk.
Kenny’s model assumes disciplined governance.
The submission assumes institutional opportunism.
The Core Vulnerability in Kenny’s Position
His argument is coherent only under these conditions:
Emergency-only use is legally enforceable.
Third-party commercial access can be prevented.
The facility does not become a market entry point.
Climate compliance can be preserved.
The governance model is constitutionally sound.
Safety Before LNG challenges all five simultaneously.
If even one collapses (especially EU third-party access), then:
The FSRU becomes structurally commercial.
Gas demand likely increases.
Private LNG becomes harder to block.
Climate exposure increases.
Kenny’s “narrow contingency tool” framing breaks down.
Final Synthesis
Without Safety Before LNG:
Kenny’s position is nuanced but defensible.
With Safety Before LNG’s legal and governance critique added:
His position appears:
Technically literate
Strategically cautious
But legally under-developed
Institutionally optimistic
And dependent on assumptions about regulatory control that may not hold
The biggest weakness exposed is this:
Kenny treats the FSRU as a controllable policy instrument.
Safety Before LNG treats it as a structural market intervention that cannot be neatly constrained once built.
That is the fault line.